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COMMENT
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER
TREBLE DAMAGE CLAIMS: THE ILLINOIS BRICK WALL CRUMBLES
INTRODUCTION
Both judicial and legislative attention have recently focused upon the
question of which parties have the right to assert private treble damage claims
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.' The question arises when a manufacturer
in a chain of distribution imposes an illegal overcharge pursuant to a
price-fixing scheme. Although in such a situation damages will be incurred by
both direct and indirect purchasers, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,2 the
Supreme Court held that the direct purchasers have the exclusive right to
bring private damage actions under section 4.
The Supreme Court refused to allow indirect purchaser suits because it
would not accept the offensive use of pass-on evidence.3 Offensive use of
pass-on evidence would enable an indirect purchaser to prove that it was an
injured party by establishing that a direct purchaser had passed on all or part
of an illegal overcharge to it. 4 The Supreme Court previously dealt with
pass-on evidence in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.-
The Hanover Shoe Court held that an antitrust defendant could not assert
defensively that a direct purchaser did not suffer a cognizable injury because
it had passed on the illegal overcharge to its customers in the lower level of
the distribution chain. 6 Although several federal courts had allowed indirect
purchaser suits despite the decision in Hanover Shoe, 7 the Illinois Brick
1. Section 4 provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business of property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
2. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3. Id. at 728.
4. McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers To Recover Treble
Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 177 (1971); Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in
Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 Win. & Mfary L. Rev. 883
(1975); Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use ofthe Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 98 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Offensive Use]; Comment, Standing To Sue in
Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 976 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Offensive Passing-On].
5. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
6. Id. at 487-88.
7. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., [1975] Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,370,
at 66,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,193, at
65,665 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus. Inc., [1972] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,484, at 94,152
(S.D. Fla. 1972). But see Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
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Court determined that rejection of a defendant's use of pass-on evidence
compelled a similar rejection of a plaintiff's offensive use of such evidence.,
The Court's rejection of indirect purchaser actions eliminates an entire class
of potential antitrust plaintiffs. Congress, finding that such a result is inap-
propriate, has drafted legislation designed to overrule Illinois Brick and limit
Hanover Shoe. 9 This legislation is likely to pass within the next year.' 0
Although the subject of indirect purchaser actions has attracted much schol-
arly attention in the past," a detailed analysis of the most recent proposed
legislation has not yet been presented.
This Comment will analyze the current congressional proposal in light of
the policy considerations involved in the recognition of indirect purchaser
damage claims. It will contend that Illinois Brick misconstrued these consid-
erations thereby resulting in an unwarranted rejection of such claims. Part I
will provide a background discussion of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. An
examination of the conflicting policy considerations concerning indirect pur-
chaser suits will follow in Part II. Part III will discuss the joint proposal of
the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary and assess its probable
impact on the effectiveness of the national antitrust policy. Finally, recom-
mendations for improving the bill will be presented in Part IV.
I. BACKGROUND
A complete evaluation of whether indirect purchasers should be within the
ambit of section 4's protection and the effect of such actions on private
enforcement of the antitrust laws necessitates a balancing of several policy
considerations. Allowing indirect purchaser suits would further both the
compensatory and deterrence objectives of antitrust law.' 2 In addition to
providing an opportunity for a large group of potential plaintiffs to seek
redress for injuries resulting from past violations, the institution and success-
ful resolution of such suits would deter future violations. 13
On the other hand, indirect purchaser suits would make section 4 actions
more complex, thereby increasing the burden placed upon the federal courts.
These actions would be difficult to manage because of the likelihood that a
single overcharge will cause many persons to suffer injuries, all of whom are
potential plaintiffs. In addition, the amount of damages would be difficult to
determine because the plaintiff must establish the extent to which the illegal
overcharge was passed on to him.' 4
8. 431 U.S. at 728-29.
9. See S. 300, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). The author would like to express his appreciation
to Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, for his assistance in
providing information concerning S. 300 and its predecessors.
10. Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (May 15, 1979).
11. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
12. Statement of John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, Dep't of
Justice, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2 (Feb. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Shenefield Statement].
13. Id. at 3.
14. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 731-33.
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Still another drawback of indirect purchaser actions is that they present a
potential for subjecting antitrust defendants to two different forms of multiple
liability. First, direct and indirect purchasers may receive overlapping dam-
age recoveries in an action based on the same illegal overcharge.' 5 Second,
juries in separate actions may render inconsistent findings as to the amount of
the overcharge passed on to the indirect purchaser or the amount absorbed by
the direct purchaser.' 6 Thus, for example, one jury may decide that the direct
purchaser absorbed seventy-five percent of the overcharge while another jury
in a subsequent indirect purchaser action may determine that sixty percent of
the same overcharge was passed on.
A. Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.
In Hanover Shoe, a shoe manufacturer sued a producer of shoe machinery
alleging that he violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 7 The damage daim
was predicated upon the defendant's practice of leasing rather than selling the
machines. The plaintiff contended that this practice was an instrument of the
defendant's attempt to monopolize the shoe machinery industry and sought to
recover the difference between the defendant's leasing price and the price of
the machines had they been sold.' 8
The Supreme Court found for the plaintiff and established an irrebuttable
presumption of direct purchaser injury, 19 holding that in order for a buyer to
recover in a section 4 action he need only prove that he paid an illegally high
price and the amount of the overcharge.2 0 In addition, the Court rejected the
defendant's attempt at escaping liability by introducing evidence that the
plaintiff had passed on the illegal overcharge and thus had not been injured .'
This rejection of the defensive use of pass-on evidence was based on three
considerations: (1) that the injury is based upon the extent of the overcharge,
mitigation being irrelevant to the assessment of damages;2 2 (2) pass-on evi-
dence would result in added complexity and its use would further burden the
15. See notes 129-66 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 130-66 infra and accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Hanover Shoe followed the decision in United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), in which
Judge Wyzanski found that United Shoe had monopolized the shoe machinery industry in violation
of § 2. Hanover Shoe then brought a private action against United Shoe, and submitted the findings
in United Shoe pursuant to § 5 of the Clayton Act which makes "[a] final judgment or decree.. ,
in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws . . . prima facie evidence against such defendant . . as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto ... " 15
U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
18. 392 U.S. at 483-84.
19. Id. at 490- 94.
20. Id. at 489.
21. Id. at 488. For a detailed synopsis of the history of the pass-on issue in this case, see id. at
488 n.6.
22. Id. at 490; accord, Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533
(1918); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906); see
Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 102-04; Offensive Passing-On, supra note 4. at 980-82.
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courts;2 3 and (3) the need to maintain effective private enforcement of the
antitrust laws.
24
In holding that the overcharge itself is the appropriate measure of dam-
ages, the Hanover Shoe Court refused to examine the remote consequences
of the illegal overcharge. 25 It relied primarily upon Southern Pacific Co. v.
Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co. ,26 in which shippers sought to recover repara-
tions from a railroad company for charging a freight rate that the Interstate
Commerce Commission found to be excessive. 27 Although the defendant
railroad company asserted that the shippers passed the overcharge on to their
customers, the Court awarded damages to the shippers based on the differ-
ence between the rates actually charged and those which would have been
reasonable. 28 The Darnell-Taenzer Court reasoned that just as the law does
not hold a defendant responsible for remote consequences, the tendency is to
limit damages to the "first step."'29 In addition, it believed that the purchaser
who dealt with the carrier should be the only one to force him to disgorge his
illegal gain because it would be futile "to follow every transaction to its
ultimate result."'30 As will be discussed later, Illinois Brick subsequently
23. 392 U.S. at 492-94; see Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 105-06; Offensive Passing-On,
supra note 4, at 982-83.
24. 392 U.S at 494; see Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 105-06; Offensive Passing-On, supra
note 4, at 983-84.
25. It did recognize, however, that when the differential between the price unlawfully
charged and the price required by law could not be ascertained, another measure, such as lost
profits, would have to be employed. 392 U.S. at 494.
.26. 245 U.S. 531 (1918). The Hanover Shoe Court further elaborated on Its finding that
subsequent mitigation is irrelevant in assessing damages: "If in the face of the overcharge the
buyer does nothing and absorbs the lbss, he is entitled to treble damages. This much seems
conceded. The reason is that he has paid more than he should and his property has been Illegally
diminished, for had the price paid been lower his profits would have been higher. It is also clear
that if the buyer, responding to the illegal price, maintains his own price but takes steps to
increase his volume or to decrease other costs, his right to damages is not destroyed .... We hold
that the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the price for his own product."
392 U.S. at 489.
In limiting the damage analysis to the initial impact of the overcharge, Hanover Shoe partially
relied on Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). In that
case, the city of Atlanta instituted a treble damage action alleging that it was injured as a result of
its purchases of iron water pipe at an excessive price. Id at 395. Although the Supreme Court did
not address the potential pass-on issue, it affirmed a judgment for the city in the amount of tihe
difference between the price actually paid and what would have been paid but for the price fixing
conspiracy. Id at 399. Emphasizing the limited scope of the damage analysis, the Chattanooga
Court stated "We do not go behind the person of the sufferer .... [Rather we] stop there." Id.
27. 245 U.S. at 533.
28. Id.
29. Although Darnell-Taenzer was not an antitrust case, Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 65 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964), held
that the decision and rationale was applicable to such cases.
30. 245 U.S. at 533-34. Although this language could be interpreted as establishing a privity
requirement in § 4 private treble damage actions, a close reading of Hanover Shoe indicates Its
reliance on Darnell-Taenzer does not warrant such a conclusion. The issue of whether § 4 requires
privity was not before the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe. Its discussion of Darnell-Taenzer was
presented solely as an example of a case holding that the potential recouping of an overcharge
from customers is irrelevant in assessing a direct purchaser's damages. 392 U.S. at 490. As
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applied this policy in rejecting indirect purchaser claims and their use of
offensive pass-on evidence.
The second factor in the Hanover Shoe Court's rejection of defensive
pass-on evidence was its perception of the added judicial burden that would
result from the use of such evidence. This factor incorporates two separate
but related concepts. The first relates to the added complexity and man-
ageability problems that would result from large damage actions. 3' The
second concerns the difficulty of proving damages. In order to establish that a
direct purchaser passed on an illegal overcharge, a defendant must explain to
the court how the purchaser arrived at a price for his product. This requires
the defendant to present economic evidence based upon demand and supply
elasticities. 32 In Hanover Shoe, the Court refused to hear such evidence
because it determined that economic theory could not reconstruct a direct
purchaser's pricing decisions. In the Court's opinion, it was questionable
whether "an economist's hypothetical model" could be employed to establish
either the existence of the overcharge or the extent to which it was passed
on. 33 The Court also established a stringent standard for proving that a direct
purchaser passed on an illegal overcharge. Assuming arguendo that economic
evidence could reconstruct the direct purchaser's pricing decisions, the Court
further required the defendant to prove "that the particular plaintiff could not
or would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge or maintained the
higher price had the overcharge been discontinued. ' 34
The primary consideration in Hanover Shoe's rejection of defensive pass-on
evidence, however, was its potential detrimental effect on private antitrust
enforcement.3 5 According to the Court, increased complexity along with
pointed out by two commentators, "[t]he Court in Hanover Shoe interpreted the Darnell-Taenzer
case as standing for the proposition that a first purchaser may sue despite the possibility that he
passed on the overcharge, not for the proposition that only the first purchaser may sue." Rodos &
McMahon, Standing To Sue of Subsequent Purchasers for Antitrust Violations-The Pass-On
Issue Reevaluated, 20 S.D. L. Rev. 107, 111 (1975).
This narrow reading of Darnell-Taenzer was expressly adopted by the Ninth Circuit in In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919
(1974). It is additionally substantiated by Hanover Shoe itself. In quoting language from
Darnelt-Taenzer, the Hanover Shoe Court deleted the following passage: "If it be said that the
whole transaction is one from a business point of view, it is enough to reply that the unity in this
case is not sufficient to entitle the purchaser to recover, any more than the ultimate consumer who
in turn paid an increased price. He has no privity with the carrier." 245 U.S. at 534. Two
commentators have suggested that the deletion of this language in the Court's lengthy quotation
from Darnel-Taenzer indicates that the Court had no intention of establishing a privity require-
ment in § 4 actions. See Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 100; Offensive Passing-On, supra note 4,
at 981 n.26. But see Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 13, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (correlating the rejection of defensive pass-on
evidence with the imposition of a privity requirement under section 4.)
31. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. at 493.
32. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 215-18 (2d ed. 1977); Schaefer, supra note 4, at
887.
33. 392 U.S.at 493.
34. Id.
35. See Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1374 n.27 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191,
1979] 1029
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
decreased efficiency could only result in an inefficacious system of enforce-
ment. If the defendant were given the opportunity to assert pass-on evidence
defensively, it would thereby eliminate the best plaintiff. Because the Court
assumed that indirect purchasers generally incur only minimal damages and
therefore would not assert many damage claims, 36 the defendant would
"retain the fruits of [its] illegality. T37 Thus, acceptance of defensive pass-on
evidence would seriously frustrate private antitrust enforcement efforts.
B. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
Illinois Brick dealt with the use of offensive rather than defensive pass-on
evidence as in Hanover Shoe. The state of Illinois, on behalf of itself and 700
governmental entities in the greater Chicago area, brought an indirect pur-
chaser damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act.3 8 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant manufacturers and distributors engaged in a
conspiracy to fix the price of concrete blocks in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.3 9 The indirect purchaser plaintiffs employed offensive pass-on
evidence to establish that they, rather than the direct purchasers, absorbed the
illegal overcharge. In rejecting their use of offensive pass-on evidence, the
Illinois Brick Court found itself constrained by the previous ruling in Hanover
Shoe. The Court determined that the exclusion of defensive pass-on evidence
required a similar rejection of offensive pass-on evidence. 40 This rejection was
predicated upon considerations of stare decisis, a desire to protect antitrust
defendants from multiple liability, and a concern for the effectiveness of
antitrust treble-damage actions. 4'
In the Court's view, the acceptance of offensive pass-on evidence required
either overruling or narrowly confining Hanover Shoe, both of which the
196 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); H R. Rep. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
n.4 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2572, 2576 n.4; Schaefer, supra note
4, at 935; Comment, Mangano and Ultimate-Consume.r Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover
Doctrine, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 394, 410 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ultimate-Consumer]. But see
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 732 n. 12 (complexity in proving pass-on was the primary
consideration); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp, 50
F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971) (same); Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 108 (judicial
burden was the primary consideration).
36. The assumption that indirect purchasers would have minimal interests in seeking relief Is
now questionable in light of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR), 15 U.S.C. §§
15c-15h (1976), discussed at notes 59-66 infra and accompanying text. See Berger & Bernstein, An
Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 Yale L.J. 809, 872 n.277 (1977); McGuire, supra
note 4, at 189-91; Schaefer, supra note 4, at 886.
37. 392 U.S. at 494.
38. 431 U.S. at 726-27.
39. 15 U.S.C § 1 (1976). The distribution chain consisted of four links: (1) manufacturers who
sold to (2) masonry contractors, who built masonry structures after their bids were accepted by (3)
general contractors, who incorporated the structures into facilities and sold them to (4) the state of
Illinois and local governmental entities. 431 U.S. at 726. The claims of the masonry and general
contractors, as well as those of the private builders, were settled without prejudice to the action
by the governmental entities. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976),
rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
40. 431 U.S. at 730.
41. Id. at 728-31.
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Court believed to be inappropriate. 42 In examining the policy considerations
raised by allowing indirect purchaser actions, the Illinois Brick Court there-
fore assumed that Hanover Shoe's irrebuttable presumption of direct purchaser
injury would remain intact. Under such circumstances, indirect purchaser
actions would create a serious threat of multiple liability because indirect
purchasers could establish damages by employing pass-on evidence while, at
the same time, defendants could not rebut a direct purchaser's claim by using
the same evidence. 4 3 In addition, conflicting claims to the overcharge in
separate suits could easily lead to inconsistent adjudications. 4 Although
procedural devices might be used to minimize the likelihood of duplicative
liability, the Court believed that even if the devices were successfully
utilized, 4 5 severe manageability problems would result.
4 6
Second, like Hanover Shoe, the Illinois Brick Court was concerned with
the problems associated with using highly technical economic theory. In its
view, the primary factor in the rejection of defensive pass-on evidence was
the Hanover Shoe Court's perception of the difficulties in reconstructing a
seller's pricing and output decisions and the resultant judicial costs of such a
reconstruction. 47 These added complexities and costs are multiplied when
offensive pass-on evidence is employed to determine the absorption and/or
pass-on of the overcharge at each successive link in a distribution chain.4 8
Emphasizing the negative impact of the introduction of economic theory,
which itself is of questionable practical value, the Court decided to preclude
its use.
Finally, the Court believed that the introduction of complex pass-on
theories along with a potentially large number of plaintiffs would increase the
cost of section 4 actions, thereby reducing the beneficial impact of providing
for treble damages. 49 Because indirect purchaser plaintiffs would be uncertain
as to the establishment and apportionment of the overcharge, their incentive
to sue would be minimal. The Illinois Brick Court therefore reasoned that the
decision in Hanover Shoe to provide direct purchasers with the exclusive right
to the full overcharge was the most effective means to enforce the antitrust
laws.5 0
In his dissent, Justice Brennan did not agree with the majority's interpre-
tation of Hanover Shoe's effect on the use of offensive pass-on evidence.
Emphasizing section 4's compensatory and deterrence objectives, he conclud-
ed that Hanover Shoe's application should be limited to cases of defensive
42. Id. at 729, 736.
43. Id. at 730.
44. Id.
45. The Court believed that existing procedural devices such as statutory interpleader, 28
U.S.C. § 1335 (1976), and rule interpleader, Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(1) as well as those available in the
Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976), would be ineffective in preventing multiple
liability. 431 U.S. at 731 n.11, 738-42.
46. 431 U.S. at 731 n.11.
47. Id. at 731-72.
48. Id. at 732-33. Plaintiffs alleged that the concrete blocks incurred an overcharge of four
cents per brick at each link in the chain resulting in overpayments exceeding $3 million. Id. at
727.
49. Id. at 745.
50. Id. at 745-46.
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assertion of pass-on evidence when direct and indirect purchasers are not
parties to the same action.5 1 This would prevent the defendant from escaping
liability and thus facilitate maximum enforcement. His interpretation of
Hanover Shoe would remove the irrebuttable presumption and allow a
defendant to assert defensive pass-on evidence against a direct purchaser
when an indirect purchaser was present in the same action. Moreover, in such
a situation, Justice Brennan would allow indirect purchasers to use offensive
pass-on evidence to prove their damages.5 2 Justice Brennan's acceptance of
offensive pass-on evidence was predicated upon several factors. In balancing
the compensatory and deterrence considerations with the problems of com-
plexity and multiple liability, he believed that the rationales for the authori-
zation of offensive and the limitation of defensive pass-on evidence represent
two different sides of the same enforcement coin. In his view, enforcement
can best be facilitated by rejecting an antitrust violator's attempt to escape
liability, while accepting an indirect purchaser's attempt to impose liability.53
II. A BALANCING APPROACH: THE CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNIZING
INDIRECT PURCHASER SUITS.
The Illinois Brick Court's extension of the concerns expressed in Hanover
Shoe established a per se rule limiting section 4 actions to direct purchasers.
This rule was a result of the Court's decision to emphasize the problems of
complexity and manageability over the compensation and deterrence objec-
tives of section 4. It is questionable, however, whether this determination will
best serve the nation's antitrust policy. Such a rigid rule is justified only if a
balancing of these considerations indicates that indirect purchaser actions are
so unmanageable and complex as to be counterproductive.
A. Compensating Those Injured by a Violation.
An examination of its legislative history and the case law establishes that
compensation is one of the primary objectives of section 4 of the Clayton
Act.5 4 In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,55 decided only six
months prior to Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed com-
pensation as being Congess' primary objective in enacting section 4.56 Accord-
ing to its evaluation of the legislative history, the treble damages provision of
section 4 "is designed primarily as a remedy.157 The Brunswick Court
51. Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The legislative history of § 4's provisions reveals that it was designed to encourage
damaged parties to seek redress for their injuries. For example, the liberal venue and jurisdic-
tional requirements, see 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provide plaintiffs with easy access to the federal
courts. 21 Cong. Rec. 2612 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Teller) (amount in controversy requirement
should be eliminated to ensure that those damaged have an opportunity to seek redress).
Moreover, although the treble damages provision serves a strong enforcement function, It also
serves as an incentive to assert § 4 damage claims. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at
755 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 21 Cong. Rec. 3148-49 (1890) (remarks of Sens. Sherman and
Edmunds).
55. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
56. Id. at 485-86.
57. Id. (footnotes omitted).
(Vol. 4 71032
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determined that this provision was conceived primarily for " '[t]he people of
the United States as individuals, especially consuters". 58 Inasmuch as con-
sumers generally do not purchase goods directly from manufacturers, this
broad compensatory objective incorporates indirect purchasers within its
purview.
The legislative history of the recent Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 197659 (HSR) provides additional support for the contention that
section 4 of the Clayton Act was designed to compensate consumers in their
status as indirect purchasers. 60 This legislation, enacted prior to the decision
in Illinois Brick, authorizes state attorneys general to institute parens patriae
suits on behalf of natural persons injured by a violation of the antitrust
laws.6 1 The damage awards are recovered in the name of the state and are
distributed in any manner authorized by the court or deposited with the state
as general revenues. 62 HSR contains provisions that encourage consumers to
bring suit 63 and that also alleviate possible procedural impediments to these
actions. 64 The legislative history of this act clearly indicates that it was
intended to facilitate the assertion of section 4 rights, which Congress believed
to include those of indirect purchasers.65 This intention was explicitly enun-
ciated by Representative Rodino when he stated:
58. Id. at 486 n.10 (emphasis added) (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen.
George)). During the congressional hearings on the treble damages provision, Senator George
further stated: "The right of action against the persons in the combination is given to the party
damnified. Who is this party injured, when, as prescribed in the bill, there has been an advance
in the price by the combination? The answer is found in the bill itself in the words, 'intended to
advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles.' The consumer is the party 'damnilied or
injured.'
"This is the express provision of the bill . . . .But even if it were not . . . it so results as a
logical necessity. An advance in price to the middlemen is not mentioned in the bill, for the
obvious reason that no such advance would damnify them. ... He buys to sell again. He buys
only for profit on a subsequent sale. So whatever he pays he receives again when he sells, together
with a profit on his investment. . . .The consumer, therefore, paying all the increased price
advanced by the middlemen and profit on the same, is the party necessarily damnified or
injured." 21 Cong. Rec. 1767 (1890); see id. at 3149 (remarks of Sen. Morgan), 3150 (remarks of
Sen. George), 2457 (remarks of Sen. Sherman), 2558 (remarks of Sen. Pugh).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976). For a historical perspective and an examination of the
viability of parens patriae actions, see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972);
California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Curtis,
The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 De Paul L. Rev. 895
(1976); Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae
and A Suggested New Approach, 85 Yale L. Rev. 626 (1976); Hoffman, Antitrust Standing:
Congress Responds to Illinois Brick, 1978 Wash. L.Q. 529, 545-551.
60. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 486 n.10 (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1914) (remarks
of Rep. Webb)); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 36, at 845-46.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976).
62. Id. § 15e.
63. Id. § 15c(d) (authorizing recovery of reasonable attorney's fees).
64. Id. § 15d (authorizing statistical sampling methods as well as fluid recovery of damages to
facilitate- a plaintiff's proof of the extent of his injury).
65. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 756-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rep.
No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 42-43 (1976)).
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[R]ecoveries are authorized by the bill whether or not the consumers purchased directly
from the price fixer, or indirectly, from intermediaries, retailers, or other middlemen.
The technical and procedural argument that consumers have no standing whenever
they are not 'in privity' with the price fixer, and have not purchased directly from him,
is rejected by the . . . bill. 66
An examination of the relevant case law also manifests a strong concern for
compensating indirect purchasers. Although earlier cases did not specifically
confront either aspect of the pass-on issue, the opinions contain language that
justifies an inference supporting the use of offensive pass-on evidence by
indirect purchasers. 67 For example, in Radovich v. National Football
League, 68 a football player brought suit under section 4 alleging that the
National Football League conspired to prevent him from playing professional
football. The defendant contended that the plaintiff's action should be
dismissed because he did not state in his pleadings the basis for his right to
damages with sufficient particularity. The Court rejected the defendant's
argument, adopting a literal interpretation of section 4 without added re-
quirements not explicitly set forth in the statute. Although the Court was
primarily concerned with the sufficiency of the pleadings, 69 this literal ap-
proach would preclude a per se rule such as that established in Illinois Brick.
Supplementing the older decisions is a majority of lower federal court
cases that interpret Hanover Shoe as allowing the utilization of offensive
pass-on evidence by indirect purchaser plaintiffs.7 0 In In re Western Asphalt
Cases,71 the Ninth Circuit rejected the application of privity to section 4 and
concluded that Hanover Shoe's primary purpose was to maintain an effective
mechanism for compensating injured parties. 72 This pro-compensation in-
terpretation of Hanover Shoe is further supported by In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation,73 which was a consolidation of builder-owner damage
claims brought by several cities, states, and private owners against manufac-
turers of hardware components. The district court, in determining that
Hanover Shoe allows indirect purchaser suits, stated:
66. 122 Cong. Rec. H10295 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976).
67. See, e.g., Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1947). In Mandeville, local
growers of sugar beets alleged that refiners of sugar had fixed the price they paid the farmers for
the beets, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Court accepted the growers' treble
damage claims based on the underpayments although the price-fixing conspiracy was Im-
plemented by purchasers rather than sellers. Id. at 235. In recognizing the damage claims, the
Court found that § 4 was "comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all those who are
made victims . . . of forbidden practices" including consumers. Id. at 236.
68. 352 U.S. 455 (1957).
69. Id. at 454.
70. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1084 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., [1975] 1 Trade Cas, (CCH)
60,370, at 66,610 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
60,193, at 65,666 (N.D. Cal.- 1975); Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus. Inc., [1973 1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,484, at 94,152 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59
F.R.D. 589, 596-97 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
71. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
72. Id. at 196.
73. [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CC) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
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[The] defendant's invocation of Hanover, which rejected a proposed pass-on defense in
order to ensure that those who violated the antitrust laws did not escape liability...
strikes a discordant note. The attempt to transform a rejection of a defense because it
unduly hampers antitrust enforcement into a reason for complete refusal to entertain
the claims of a certain class of [indirect purchaser] plaintiffs seems an ingenious
attempt to turn the decision and its underlying rationale on its head.74
Thus, both cases determined that the authorization of indirect purchaser suits
was an essential means to provide compensation for those actually injured.
Despite the importance given to compensation by Congress and the
judiciary, Illinois Brick nonetheless prevented indirect purchasers from seek-
ing redress. Initially, the Court found that the legislative history of HSR was
not dispositive because the statements were made after the passage of the
Clayton Act.75 The Court believed that HSR "simply created a new pro-
cedural device . . . to enforce existing rights of recovery under § 4."76
Inasmuch as the Illinois Brick Court determined that indirect purchasers had
no substantive rights before the bill's enactment and that its passage created
no new substantive liability, it found that the preclusion of indirect purchaser
actions was not improper.
Such a finding, however, is totally inconsistent with the Court's conclusion
in Brunswick. There, the Court determined that section 4 granted substantive
rights to consumers who, as noted above," generally do not purchase directly
from the manufacturer. In addition, not only does Illinois Brick severely limit
section 4 damage actions, but its restrictions also preclude indirect purchaser
consumer suits under HSR. Assuming arguendo that the Court's contention
that HSR's legislative history is not dispositive as to section 4 is correct, such
a conclusion with respect to parens patriae actions is untenable.
Even if compensation is the primary objective of section 4, both the Illinois
Brick Court and opponents of offensive pass-on evidence believe that indirect
purchaser actions will not provide any additional compensation to injured
parties. First, as noted by the Court, the size and complexity of these actions
will significantly increase the cost of litigation and decrease individual re-
coveries. 78 Second, two eminent antitrust scholars suggest that the manufac-
turer's litigation costs will ultimately be passed on to consumers, thereby
reducing the effect of any recovery.7 9 These arguments, however, assume all
the characteristics of a genuine catch 22 dilemma. As will be discussed below,8"
there are often situations in which direct purchasers will be reluctant to
74. Id. at 94,978-79.
75. 431 U.S. at 733-34 n.14.
76. Id.
77. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
78. 431 U.S. at 745; see Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 206-07 (1976); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They
Work?, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1319, 1339-40 (1973).
79. Fair and Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on S. 1874 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 69-71 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1874 Hearings] (statement of Michael Blechman and
Milton Handler); Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The 23rd Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1971).
80. See notes 89-98 infra and accompanying text.
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bring section 4 actions. Thus, if indirect purchasers are precluded from
bringing section 4 damage claims, manufacturers will be free to increase their
prices pursuant to price-fixing schemes, whereas if such claims are recognized,
the cost of such suits will be passed on to consumers and ultimately increase
the price of the relevant product. These arguments, however, overlook past
decisions in which sizeable recoveries have been awarded.8 1 In addition, they
ignore the fact that the suits are asserted to correct the faults of a displaced
market system in order to increase competition and lower prices.8 2 Precluding
such suits would paradoxically allow the manufacturer to maintain his
unlawful prices and prevent the legal system from supplementing the market
pressures that attempt to set reasonable prices.
B. Deterrence and Enforcement
Deterrence and enforcement will be analyzed together because they both
focus on minimizing the negative effects of antitrust violations. Moreover, the
effectiveness of section 4's deterrence function is largely determined by the
perceived threat of vigorous enforcement while the enforcement goal is
simultaneously served by effective deterrence. Although from a deterrence
standpoint it is irrelevant which type of purchaser actually asserts a claim, it
is nonetheless essential to maximize the availability of potential plaintiffs to
ensure effective antitrust enforcement.8 3
The effect of indirect purchaser suits on these two considerations requires
a determination of the optimum means of preventing anticompetitive behav-
ior and ameliorating its negative effects. This, according to Illinois Brick
proponents, can best be accomplished by concentrating enforcement of section
4 exclusively in the hands of direct purchasers.84 Supporters of this contention
believe that direct purchasers are in the best position to discover antitrust
violations.8 5 They also point out that direct purchasers assert the majority of
treble damage actions. Substantiating this claim is a study of 1975 and 1976
price-fixing cases which indicates that direct purchaser suits outnumbered
those brought by indirect purchasers by three to one.8 6 Opponents of indirect
purchaser actions also contend that the effort to compensate indirect pur-
chasers will reduce direct purchaser recoveries, thereby decreasing their
incentive to bring section 4 actions. 87 Because the authorization of indirect
81. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.) ($37,000,000),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. (1971); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,193
(N.D. Cal. 1975) ($32,712,081); Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on H.R.
8359 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House of Representatives
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 42-43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 8359
Hearings] (statement of Arizona Attorney General Babbit).
82. H.R. 8359 Hearings, supra note 81, at 463-64 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); M. Green,
The Closed Enterprise System 50 (1972).
83. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 67 (statement of Michael Blechman and Milton
Handler); H.R. 8359 Hearings, supra note 81, at 193 (statement of Richard Posner).
85. S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 67 (statement of Michael Blechman and Milton
Handler); H.R. 8359 Hearings, supra note 81, at 193 (statement of Richard Posner).
86. S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 67 n.9 (statement of Michael Blechman and Milton
Handler).
87. Id. at 69-71 (statement of Michael Blechman and Milton Handler).
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purchaser suits is designed merely to supplement enforcement by direct
purchasers, a decrease in actions by the latter group is viewed as being
counterproductive to the overall enforcement effort.
8 8
Supporters of indirect purchaser suits, however, emphasize the problematic
nature of concentrating private enforcement of the antitrust laws in direct
purchasers. According to the findings of a House Judiciary Committee report,
"indirect purchasers have been equally significant in antitrust enforcement. "8 9
This significance is further substantiated by another recent study of price-
fixing cases since 1960 which established that almost two-thirds of these
section 4 cases involved indirect purchasers and over twenty-five percent were
brought exclusively by indirect purchasers. 90 In addition, these supporters
also believe that the 1975-1976 study was an inaccurate measure of the
importance of direct purchaser suits because some courts did not recognize
indirect purchaser claims. 9' More importantly, many of those classilied as direct
purchasers were simultaneously claiming substantial damages in their status
as indirect purchasers, with the latter claim often providing the major
impetus for the suit. 9
2
Proponents of indirect purchaser actions further question the incentive of
direct purchasers to bring section 4 actions. First, because direct purchasers
can pass on a substantial portion of an illegal overcharge to their customers,
they frequently have little incentive to bear the risks and expenses of
litigation.93 Second, when a direct purchaser's selling price is determined by
simply adding a percentage mark-up to its costs, it may actually profit from
the manufacturer's overcharge because its percentage mark-up will be applied
to a larger base price. 94 Third, even assuming it suffers an injury, a direct
88. Id.
89. H.R. Rep. No. 1397 (pt. 1), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House
Report].
90. See S. Rep. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate
Report].
91. H.R. 8359 Hearings, supra note 81, at 16 (statement of Assistant Attorney General John
Shenefield).
92. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 9.
93. Id. at 7-8; S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 10 (statement of Sen. Scott), 112
(statement of Colorad6 Assistant Attorney General Hill); Shenefield Statement, supra note 12, at 3;
Schaefer, supra note 4, at 913.
94. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974); 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 7; S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 10
(statement of Sen. Scott), 112 (statement of Colorado Assistant Attorney General Hill). West
Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) provides an example of direct purchasers profiting
from the imposition of a manufacturer's illegal overcharge. In Pfi:er, wholesalers sold prescrip-
tion drugs to retail druggists at a mark-up of 162% over cost. The druggists then imposed
additional uniform increases of 662h% over their costs in selling these drugs to consumers. The
result of these mark-ups, according to the court, was "that [the] wholesalers and retailers, far
from sustaining damages, made substantial profits from [the] antitrust violations." Id. at 745.
One druggist who declined to institute a damage claim asserted. "Any pharmacy claiming
damages is, in my opinion, guilty of lying. All pharmacies base their retail prices for drugs on
their costs, either using a fixed percentage or a professional fee. Either way, they do not suffer
damages due to higher wholesale costs of these drugs. If anyone has a complaint, it would be the
individual consumer, not the pharmacists." Id. at 746.
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purchaser's dependence upon the manufacturer as a source of supply might
result in a reluctance to initiate a section 4 damage action.9" Lastly, the direct
purchaser may not want to subject itself to the extensive discovery re-
quests that would follow the institution of a suit because of possible detection
of its own illegal activities.
96
Thus, it is apparent that in some situations indirect purchasers are often the
only private parties willing to enforce the antitrust laws. 97 From an enforce-
ment and deterrence perspective, therefore, establishing direct purchasers as
the exclusive agents of this private enforcement effort is unwise. Illinois
Brick's failure in this respect is aptly pointed out by the House Committee
on the Judiciary:
[A] major purpose of the Clayton Act is to deter would-be violators. This purpose is
not well served by a rule that sharply limits the number of plaintiffs who can challenge
a violation. The deterrent effect of the treble damage remedy is lessened when the
violator knows his liability ends with his customers.98
The rejection of indirect purchaser suits has an additional negative effect on
antitrust enforcement. Besides eliminating an entire class of plaintiffs from
claiming damages pursuant to section 4, it also, as mentioned above, appears
to vitiate the parens patriae cause of action provided by HSR. 99 These
actions are brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act'0 0 which, according to
Illinois Brick, has the same privity requirement as section 4.101 Such a
determination would render the legislation virtually useless. Thus, Illinois
Brick eliminates a significant portion of potential antitrust enforcers, thereby
weakening deterrence, a result which is inimical to one of the primary
purposes of section 4 private treble damage actions.
C. The Reliability of Pass-on Evidence
The preceding analysis of section 4's compensation and deterrence objec-
tives establishes substantial support for indirect damage claims. A complete
evaluation of Illinois Brick, however, requires balancing these interests with
the problems inherent in indirect purchaser actions such as the added com-
95. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974); S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 10 (statement of Sen. Scott), 122 (statement
of Colorado Assistant Attorney General Hill); Shenefield Statement, supra note 12, at 4.
96. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974); S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 10 (statement of Sen. Scott), 122 (statement
of Colorado Assistant Attorney General Hill); Shenefield Statement, supra note 12, at 4.
97. As one eminent antitrust attorney stated: "I think [Illinois Brick] detract[sl from the
enforceability of the antitrust laws by confining enforcement, at least in one major section, to
people who are part of the club. It is pretty hard to sue somebody who has just taken you down
to Georgia on a shooting trip, for example. If you are a little removed away from them, you may
bring a suit where he will not bring suit." S. 1874 Heanngs supra note 79, at 52 (statement of
Harold Kohn).
98. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 8.
99. Id. at 10; S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 121 (statement of Chauncey Browning), 123
(statement of Richard Turner), 178 (statement of Samuel Murphy); Shenefield Statement, supra
note 12, at 5. But see S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 163 (statement of Ross Young).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
101. 431 U.S. at 733-34 n.14; see notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
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plexity of pass-on evidence. Opponents of indirect purchaser actions em-
phasize the negative aspects of utilizing pass-on evidence either defensively or
offensively because of its reliance on economic theory. They contend that
economic theory is a complex and unreliable means of proving liability and
calculating damages. 10 2 One commentator further accentuated this problem
by asserting that even if economic evidence could be utilized effectively, "the
element of irrationality in pricing and purchasing would render the analysis
suspect."
1 0 3
In addition to questioning the validity and complex application of economic
theory itself, its opponents, appropos of Hanover Shoe, assert that the
measure of damages that would result from the utilization of offensive pass-on
evidence is inequitable. 10 4 This inequity results from imposing a damage
award that includes the mark-ups at each successive intermediate level.
According to one economist, the ultimate damage assessment is based upon
too many arbitrary factors and thus is unjustifiably punitive to antitrust
defendants. 0 5 Because the defendant has no control over the number of links
in the chain, the proportion of the overcharge absorbed to that passed on, and
the intermediate mark-ups, 0 6 it is unjust to hold him liable for these subse-
quent increases. Inasmuch as the incorporation of these mark-ups would
result in great uncertainty as to the scope of a defendant's potential liability,
the opponents of offensive pass-on would limit the damage figure to the ini-
tial overcharge. 10
7
Although proponents of indirect purchaser suits generally concede that
introducing pass-on evidence would result in additional complications, they
believe that this potential for complexity is greatly exaggerated.' 0 8 The
economic evidence needed to prove pass-on and to establish damages would
entail a presentation of the elasticities of supply and demand in the relevant
market. Elasticity theory indicates the responsiveness of the quantity supplied
by producers and/or demanded by consumers to a given percentage change in
the competitive price. 10 9 As a general rule, the more inelastic the demand, the
102. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 731-33; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. at 492-93; Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970). affd sub nom. Mangano v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); Majority Report of
The Committee on Trade Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House of Representatives
Comm. on the Judiciary, at 6-9 (Apr. 17, 1978) [hereinafter cited as New York Majority Report].
103. See Note, Scaling The Illinois Brick Wall: The Future Of Indirect Purchasers In
Antitrust Litigation, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 309, 312 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Future of
Indirect Purchasers].
104. New York Majority Report, supra note 102, at 11-12, 30.
105. Id. at 10-12, 30.
106. Id. at 13.
107. Statement of Betty Bock, Member of the Committee on Trade Regulation of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopolies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, at 20-21 (Apr. 17, 1977) (hereinafter cited as
Bock Statement].
108. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 4, at 185; Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the
Passing-on Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 Antitrust Bull. !183. 1210 (1968).
109. See R. Posner, supra note 32, at 196-97; P. Samuelson. Economics, 381-90 (10th ed.
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greater the buyer will absorb the overcharge.' 1 ° The seller in this situation
can increase the cost of his product without decreasing its demand to a degree
that would cause a loss of total revenue. Because purchasers are willing to
continue buying a product, such as gasoline, despite its increased cost, the
seller can pass on the overcharge. Conversely, as demand becomes more
elastic, the seller must absorb a larger portion of the overcharge.' I In this
situation purchasers are not willing to pay the higher price; they will substi-
tute another similar product assuming one is available. Thus, the seller will
be forced to maintain his price while incurring the increased costs. 1 12 Elastic-
ity theory also indicates that in most manufacturing and/or distribution
chains the direct purchaser passes on some portion of the overcharge. 1
13
Complete absorption, or an exclusive direct purchaser injury, will occur only
when demand is perfectly elastic, which is a rare occurrence.' 14
Use and application of economic theory can provide the statistics necessary
to show which purchaser was injured, and to what extent." 3I Indeed, such
evidence is used in tax incidence theory, which examines the effect that excise
taxes have on the supply and/or demand for a product."16 In addition,
economists often make daily forecasts based on elasticity analysis concerning
the effect that anticipated changes in inputs would have on a business's sales
and profits. 1" 7 As one economist stated to the House Committee on the
Judiciary:
[These calculations] are the basis for necessary pragmatic business decisions. Even if
these forecasts seldom are precise to the last dollar, they meet the real world test of
being an important basis for major corporate policy decisions. Such forecasts incorpo-
rate the very same real world considerations which enter into an antitrust damages
calculation. 118
Thus, acceptance of this method of projecting and calculating the effects of
business ventures provides sufficient support for its application in assessing
1976); Schaefer, supra note 4, at 887-97. Demand is elastic when a decrease in price increases the
quantity demanded to the extent that total revenue (price times quantity) increases. Elasticity is
unitary when the percentage decrease in price results in a proportionate increase in quantity
demanded which maintains the preexisting level of total revenue. Demand is inelastic when the
percentage decrease in price elicits a negligible increase in quantity demanded so as to result In a
decrease of total revenue. P. Samuelson, supra, at 382.
110. See P. Samuelson, supra note 109, at 389-90; Schaefer, supra note 4, at 893.
111. See R. Posner, supra note 32, at 221-22; P. Samuelson, supra note 109, at 390.
112. See R. Posner, supra note 32, at 390; Schaefer, supra note 4, at 891.
113. Schaefer, supra note 4, at 897.
114. Id. at 893. Thus, Illinois Brick's preclusion of indirect purchaser suits along with
Hanover Shoe's presumption of direct purchaser injury will result in a windfall recovery for direct
purchasers who will automatically recover for damages relating to the overcharge which has been
passed on.
115. Id. at 887. But see Bock Statement, supra note 107, at 11-12.
116. See P. Samuelson, supra note 109, at 389; Schaefer, supra note 4, at 883, 887, 893; I.R.
8359 Hearings, supra note 81, at 200 (statement of Peter Max).
117. H.R. 8359 Hearings, supra note 81, at 200 (statement of Peter Max). In addition, the
statement of Kenneth Reed providing statistics of the Portland Cement Association clearly
establishes that manufacturers often make detailed calculations concerning the nature and extent
of the pass-on of a price increase. Id. at 43-56.
118. Id. at 200.
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antitrust damages. Inasmuch as a manufacturer's pricing decisions often
result from a cost-benefit analysis based on such calculations, the same
analysis can and should be used in determining both liability and the extent of
damages when the manufacturer's decision results in a violation of the
antitrust laws.119
The liberal standard of proof required in antitrust actions provides addi-
tional support for permitting the use of economic evidence. Many courts have
held that in such actions the jury may assess damages based on reasonable
estimates and "act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and
positive proof."' 20 Several courts have liberalized this standard of proof to a
greater degree in class actions.'12 Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., '22 provides a
useful example. In Bray, retailers conspired to underpay cattlemen for their
beef. The court rejected the retailers' attempt to escape liability, and assessed
damages on the basis of national averages, which was held to be a reasonable
method of calculation. 12
3
In addition, principles of equity can be offered in response to the argument
that offensive pass-on evidence would result in an unjust damage assessment
against the defendant. 24 These include the traditional maxim that a
wrongdoer cannot be allowed to profit from his own wrong. '2 5 Illinois Brick's
emphasis on complexity problems and its per se rule, however, condones and
legitimizes this inequitable situation. The effect of the Court's holding is to
minimize deterrence by encouraging antitrust violators to design their wrong-
doings in the most complex manner possible. The more difficult it is to
determine damages, the more likely that a violator will escape prosecution.
2 6
As the Sup~reme Court has pointed out in a different setting, such a result is
particularly inequitable because it is the defendant's successful control of the
market that eliminates a more precise method of calculation.' 2 7
119. See Kohn & Kaplan, The Antitrust Class Suit: A Manageable Instrument for Social
Justice, 41 Antitrust L.J. 292, 296 (1972).
120. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561-64 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 377-79 (1927); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1975) 1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 60,193, at 65,667 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
121. See, e.g., In re Arizona Bakery Prods. Litigation, [1976] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,120,
at 70,078 (D. Ariz. 1976); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, [1976] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) S
60,915, at 69,004 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 5
60,193, at 65,666-67 (N.D. Cal. 1975); In re Coordinated Pre-trial Proceedings in Antibiotics
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). "[Tihere is in most cases no reason
why damages must be computed separately for each individual claimant. Alternatives include
ascertaining a dollar amount statistically arrived at for the entire conspiracy which can be
translated into percentage of purchase formula for distribution, or ascertaining damages directly
as a percentage of, or formula related to, the price charged which can again be used across the
board in distribution." Kohn & Kaplan, supra note 119, at 296.
122. [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,193 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
123. Id. at 65,667. But see Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,772 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
124. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 372 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563-66 (1931).
125. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.. 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
126. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946).
127. Id. In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), the
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Clearly the factors of increased complexity and judicial burden must be
considered in a balancing approach concerned with the merits of indirect
purchaser suits. It appears, however, that the complexity problem is exag-
gerated, and that a per se rule barring such suits is an inequitable "cure more
debilitating than the disease.'
'1 28
D. Multiple Liability
The final consideration involved in discussing the impact of indirect
purchaser actions is that of protecting the defendant from multiple liability.
Because the Illinois Brick Court assumed that Hanover Shoe's irrebuttable
presumption would remain intact and therefore a defendant could not assert
that an overcharge had been passed on, it would not allow an indirect
purchaser to use pass-on evidence to establish that he had suffered damages.
Inasmuch as the direct purchaser is presumed to have absorbed the full
overcharge, any recovery on the part of an indirect purchaser would duplicate
the damages already assessed. 129 If Hanover Shoe's irrebuttable presumption
is removed, indirect purchasers may subject a defendant to a different form of
multiple liability. Juries in separate actions may render inconsistent findings
as to the amount of the overcharge that was passed on, thereby forcing the
defendant to pay overlapping damage awards) 130
Initially, supporters of indirect purchaser actions argue that the threat of
multiple liability is minimal.13 ' Substantiating this contention are con-
gressional findings that show that in the nine years between Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick duplicative damages were never awarded. 132 Assuming
arguendo that the threat of multiple liability is genuine, proponents of indirect
purchaser actions assert that existing procedural devices, the statute of
limitations, and the doctrine of collateral estoppel virtually eliminate any
potential problems. 133 Moreover, they contend that courts can allocate dam-
ages in such a way as to preclude duplicative recoveries.' 34 Finally, although
Court further elaborated on the uncertainty of proving damages: "The rule which precludes the
recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to
those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect to
their amount." Id. at 562.
128. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 36, at 877.
129. 431 U.S. at 730; accord, Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
130. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
60,370, at 66,610 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, (19731 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 74,680, at 94,979
(D. Conn. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961, 965 (1967);
1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 12; Shenefield Statement, supra note 12, at 6-8.
132. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 12.
133. See, e.g., Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T
60,370, at 66,610 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 74,680, at 94,979
(D. Conn. 1973); 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 12; Shenefield Statement, supra note 12, at
6-8.
134. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.21 191, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
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some proponents concede that a potential problem does exist, they nonetheless
conclude that the negative aspects of allowing indirect purchaser actions are
outweighed by their positive effects on the objectives of compensation and
deterrence.13
5
The procedural devices suggested to reduce the possibility of multiple
liability by the supporters of indirect purchaser actions include statutory
interpleader, intervention, joinder, and transfer and consolidation pursuant to
the Multidistrict Litigation Act. 13 6 An examination of these procedures,
however, leads to the conclusion that they will not totally eliminate the
potential for multiple liability.
Statutory interpleader137 is a means by which an antitrust defendant can
bring all claimants together in one forum and require them to determine the
distribution of damages among themselves. 38 In order to employ this device,
the amount involved must be at least five hundred dollars, and two or more
adverse claimants must be domiciled in different states. 1 39 An additional
condition requires the stakeholder, the antitrust defendant, to deposit the
amount in dispute with the court or post a bond in such amount.'
40
Assuming Hanover Shoe's presumption of direct purchaser injury is elimi-
nated, this device could protect an antitrust defendant from both forms of
multiple liability as it would bring present direct and indirect purchasers
together in one forum. This is made possible by provisions allowing service of
process anywhere in the country,' 4 1 along with liberal venue requirements. -4 2
Commentators, however, have pointed out several drawbacks to this alterna-
tive. Initially, they contend that this device may create complex class actions
which may be dismissed as unmanageable. 43 In addition, if the amount in
dispute is very large, requiring the defendant to post bond may preclude use
of this device. 4 4 Moreover, any defendant that uses statutory interpleader
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co.. 440 F.2d 1079, 1084 (Zd
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F.
Supp. 961, 964-65 (1967); 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 12; Rodos & McMahon, supra
note 30, at 120; Ultimate-Consumer, supra note 35, at 410-11.
135. McGuire, supra note 4, at 192; Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 113-14; Offensive
Passing-On, supra note 4, at 976.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
137. Id. § 1335.
138. See, e.g., Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp.. [9751 1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,370, at 66,610 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74.680, at 94,979
(D. Conn. 1973); Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 117.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1976). Statutory interpleader must be distinguished from rule
interpleader, which requires complete diversity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(1).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(aX2) (1976).
141. See id. § 2361. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally limit service of process to
the state's territorial limits or as extended by long arm statutes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(1).
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976) (action can be brought in any district court where one or
more of the claimants reside).
143. See McGuire, supra note 4, at 197; Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 113-14; Offensite
Passing-on, supra note 4, at 994.
144. 3A Moore's Federal Practice 22.10 (2d ed. 1974); see note 140 supra and accompanying
text. Although this bond requirement appears to be prohibitive, courts possess the discretionary
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must be willing to concede the antitrust violation.' 45 Finally, this alternative
would be an inefficacious means to cure the inconsistent adjudications prob-
lem if the defendant is unaware of all those purchasers who will bring actions
under section 4.
Intervention also can decrease the likelihood of multiple liability. This
procedure may be used by either a direct or an indirect purchaser, as long as
he could establish that he has interests which may be adversely affected by
the judgment in the pending action.146 Interests may be adversely affected, 14 7
and thus protected, if, for example, the pass-on issue may be decided against
the potential intervenor. This mechanism's utility, however, would be nul-
lified if the absent purchaser does not voluntarily seek to intervene, or if his
application is not timely.' 48 In such a situation, the potential for inconsistent
adjudications would still remain.
Although the defendant cannot compel a purchaser's use of intervention,
either absent purchaser could be joined as a necessary party pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(2)(ii). According to this rule, the
purchaser not yet present shall be joined if his absence may cause "any of the
persons already parties [to be] subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest."' 49 This procedure, however, has several limitations. Its application
requires the plaintiff to provide the court with the names of known absent
claimants so that it may notify them that an action is pending. 5 ° As already
mentioned, some purchasers may not assert claims to the overcharge, and
thus the plaintiff will not know that they are potential claimants. Even
assuming that the plaintiff can supply the court with these names, the
prospective plaintiffs may present an unmanageable class, or be beyond the
personal jurisdiction of the court.' 5' If a purchaser is beyond the personal
jurisdiction of the court, he may bring a suit in another jurisdiction. This suit
would raise the potential for inconsistent findings as to the pass-on issue,
thereby exposing the defendant to multiple liability.
authority to set the amount of the bond low enough so as to ensure the device's general
availability. See Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 116.
145. See Offensive Passing-On, supra note 4, at 994. In addition, damages must be liqui-
dated. Id.
146. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
147. Id. R. 24(a)(2).
148. Id. R. 24(a).
149. Id. R. 19(a)(2)(ii). It appears that rule 19(a)(2)(i) would provide an additional reason
for permitting joinder of indirect and direct purchaser damage claims arising out of the same
antitrust violation. Inasmuch as the pass-on issue may be decided in favor of the purchaser who
instituted the damage claim, (i.e., a direct purchaser) the absence of the other purchaser (an
indirect purchaser) "may as a practical matter impair or impede [the latter's] ability to protect
[his] interest." Id. One commentator suggests two interpretations of rule 19 that would further
minimize the potential for multiple liability. First, a court should find that an absent purchaser
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action unless he expressly disclaims the interest.
Second, the absent purchaser should be joined if he has sone interest in the controversy and a
judgment in his absence would expose any persons already parties to a substantial risk of incurring
multiple liability. See McGuire, supra note 4, at 202.
150. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(c).
151. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 739-40.
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The Multidistrict Litigation Act also may provide some additional help to
antitrust defendants. Under the provisions of the Act, a defendant may
request the transfer 5 2 and consolidation15 3 of indirect purchaser claims. The
protection against inconsistent adjudications afforded by these procedures,
however, is once again limited to situations in which both purchasers have
actually brought suit in different district courts.
The Clayton Act's four year statute of limitations is also advanced as a way
to reduce the potential for multiple liability. Is4 Initially, proponents of Illinois
Brick believe that because indirect purchasers rarely have knowledge of a
violation, they may not bring section 4 actions until the termination of a
successful direct purchaser suit.I ss Assuming this is true, it is further asserted
that the protracted nature of civil antitrust actions effectively bars the
commencement of a subsequent suit within the allotted time period.
Is 6
Reliance on this statute, however, has not met with unanimous approval. 5 7
It is quite possible that the direct purchaser suit may terminate within the
four year period, leaving sufficient time for an indirect purchaser to institute
an action.
Another alternative is the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Two courts have
stated that use of this doctrine could minimize the potential for inconsistent
adjudications in separate actions. ' 58 They contend that a defendant could use
a jury finding in a prior action to collaterally estop relitigation of the pass-on
issue in any subsequent proceeding. This argument, however, is without
merit. In almost all cases, the plaintiff In the subsequent action was not a
party to the prior suit, and therefore is not bound by the jury finding
concerning the pass-on issue. Thus, the doctrine cannot be used to deny him
his day in court.' 5 9
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
153. See id. § 1407; 2 Moore's Federal Practice: Manual for Complex Litigation § 5.20-40
(2d ed. 1976) (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation may consolidate actions for trial as well as
pretrial proceedings); Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1001 (1974).
154. Plaintiffs must commence the antitrust suit within four years of the accrual of the action.
See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976).
155. See S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 67 (statement of Michael Blechman and Milton
Handler); H.R. 8359 Hearings, supra note 81, at 193 (statement of Richard Posner).
156. See Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,370, at
66,610 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Il. 1973);
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680, at 94,979 (D. Conn.
1973); Ultimate-Consumer, supra note 35, at 410-11.
157. See Offensive Passing-On, supra note 4, at 994-95.
158. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, S96 (N.D. IIl. 1973); In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation, [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680, at 94,979 (D. Conn. 1973). See also
Note, Illinois Brick: The Death Knell of Ultimate Consumer Antitrust Suits, 52 St. John's L. Rev.
421, 443 n.87 (1978).
159. Blonder-Tongue Labs., v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971);
Carnivale Bag. Co., v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,370, at 66,610
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); 1B Moore's Federal Practice 0.411-.412, .441[3], at 1251, 3781 (2d ed.
1974); Offensive Passing-On, supra note 4, at 995. But see The Pillar, Feb. 21, 1979 at 11, col. 1.
One commentator suggests that a more cogent argument favoring the use of collateral estoppel
could be based upon one of the policies underlying the doctrine-protecting absent parties.
According to this argument, it is not inequitable to bind a subsequent claimant to the original
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Realizing that the above mentioned alternatives do not completely eliminate
the multiple liability problem,' 6 1 other proponents of indirect purchaser
damage claims turn to the apportionment of damages for relief. 16' In order to
use this alternative, however, Hanover Shoe's holding must be limited. First,
the irrebuttable presumption of direct purchaser injury must be removed so
that indirect purchasers may bring section 4 actions. Second, proponents
suggest that damages include the profits the direct purchaser lost as a result of
the violation.162 When a direct purchaser is forced to raise his price as a result
of such a violation, he will lose profits if the revenue lost from decreased
demand exceeds the additional revenue gained from the higher sales
price. Allowing a recovery for this loss will provide both indirect and direct
purchasers with adequate compensation while not subjecting the defendant to
multiple liability. Although supporters of this alternative concede that it may
increase the defendant's total liability, they argue that it is a foreseeable result
of his illegal conduct.1 6 3 The effectiveness of apportioning damages as a
means of preventing multiple liability, however, is limited to those situations
in which both types of purchasers are present in the same action. Thus,
although it would eliminate the potential for duplicative recoveries, it would
not reduce the possibility of inconsistent adjudications.
E. Summary
Although the potential for multiple liability presents a strong argument
for denying indirect purchaser damage actions, a majority of the commen-
tators1 64 and the lower federal courts165 that have dealt with the problem
judgment because both the defendant and the subsequent claimant would want the original
plaintiff's pass-on allegation rejected. Offensive Passing-on, supra note 4, at 995. This argument,
however, is tenuous because the defendant is not likely to present evidence in a manner that
would facilitate a subsequent action by an absent purchaser.
160. A complete elimination of the multiple liability problem is achieved by HSR which bars
private litigation of all § 4 claims previously adjudicated in it parens patriae suit and/or excludes
from recovery in a subsequent parens patriae suit any damages already awarded on behalf of
injured private parties. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1)(A), (c)(B)(3).
161. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1084 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F.
Supp. 961, 964 (S.D. Cal. 1967); 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 12; Rodos & MeMahon,
supra note 30, at 120; Offensive Use, supra note 4, at 995-96; Ultimate-Consumer, supra note 35,
at 410-11.
162. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); Rodos & McMahon, supra note 30, at 117-20.
163. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); Rodos & McMahon, supra note 30, at 118-20.
164. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 36, at 875, 878; Rodos & McMahon, supra note 30,
at 125-27; McGuire, supra note 4, at 192; Schaefer, supra note 4, at 993; Offensive Use, supra
note 4, at 117; Offensive Passing-on, supra note 4, at 1000.
165. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198-201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp. [1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,370, at 66,610 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (1975] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,193, at 65,667 (N. D. Cal. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D.
III. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961, 964 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
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conclude that a per se rule, such as that established in Illinois Brick, is an
inappropriate and harsh solution. One court, recognizing the importance of
indirect purchaser actions, stated that "[t]he day is long past when ... federal
courts will deny relief to a deserving plaintiff merely because of procedural
difficulties or problems of apportioning damages."' 66 Thus, notwithstanding
the multiple liability problem, indirect purchaser damage actions continue to
draw cogent support.
A careful analysis of the legislative history and judicial interpretations of
section 4 reveals a fundamental concern for antitrust enforcement. This
concern manifests itself in the statute's provisions which facilitate private
enforcement by emphasizing the objectives of compensation and deterrence.
Although recognition of indirect purchaser damage claims may result in some
additional judicial complexities as well as potential problems for antitrust
defendants, a balancing approach indicates that section 4's twin objectives
can best be served by the authorization of such claims.
III. S. 300-THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO Illinois Brick
AND Hanover Shoe
Congress, responding to Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe, has proposed
remedial legislation that authorizes indirect purchaser damage actions and the
use of pass-on evidence. The most recent draft S. 300, the Antitrust Improve-
ment Act of 1979,167 is a joint proposal co-sponsored by Senator Kennedy and
Representative Rodino. This bill represents a compromise of previous pro-
posals drafted by both the House and Senate during the last two years.' 68
A. Section 41(1)-Illinois Brick Overruled
Section 2 of the current proposal amends the Clayton Act by adding Section
41. Section 41(1)provides:
In any action under section 4, 4A or 4C of the Clayton Act, the fact that a person or
the United States has not dealt directly with the defendant shall not bar or otherwise
limit recovery. 169
166. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973. cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974).
167. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
168. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) and H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (19781 were
introduced on July 15, 1977. These original, identical proposals were concerned with protecting
both direct and indirect purchasers who were in fact injured. The language was drafted soon
after the Illinois Brick decision in very simple and broad terms in order to initiate an analysis of
the relevant policy issues at the earliest possible date. On May 25, 1978. after ten days of
hearings, S. 1874 was ordered favorably reported to the Senate. S. Rep. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19, 20 (1978). The hearings before the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law yielded a more comprehensive proposal-H.R. 11942, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1978). This bill
was designed to overcome the criticism of S. 1874, and was favorably reported to the House on
June 20, 1978. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 29-30. Neither S. 1874 nor H.R 11942,
however, was considered by their respective congressional chambers before the end of the 95th
Congress. The original draft of the current proposal, S. 300, was initially introduced by Senator
Kennedy on January 31, 1979. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) 125 Cong. Rec. S855 (daily ed.
Jan. 31, 1979). The current proposal, an amended version of this earlier draft, was favorably
reported out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on May 8, 1979 by a nine to eight vote.
New York Times, May 9, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 6.
169. S. 300, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2 (1979).
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This section overrules Illinois Brick by specifically providing a cause of action
for indirect purchasers. One should note that these actions are explicitly
authorized under section 4C, the parens patriae title of HSR. This evinces a
congressional concern that Illinois Brick's rejection of indirect purchaser
actions would also prevent such actions under HSR. 170 By mentioning section
4C, this provision effectively eliminates the potential need for further judicial
interpretation of the scope of the parens patriae remedy.
The next point of interest concerns the scope of protection provided by
section 41(1). The actions authorized therein are available to all "persons."
This language is less explicit than an earlier proposal which stated that
actions could be brought by purchasers and/or sellers in a chain of manufac-
ture, production, or distribution.1 7 1 The current proposal's incorporation of
such vague language may create problems in the future when courts attempt
to reconcile the bill with existing standing tests under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 172 It should be noted that Illinois Brick was not decided on the ground
of standing. The scope of the Court's analysis focused upon evidentiary
problems of proving pass-on rather than whether indirect purchasers were too
remote to assert damage claims under section ,.173 Nonetheless, the current
proposal's failure to enunciate how it relates to the three recognized tests for
standing under section 4 leaves a court free to find that an indirect purchaser
is too remote to seek damages even though Congress might have desired that
such purchaser have standing to bring a claim.' 74
170. Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on tile
Judiciary (May 15, 1979).
171. See S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979) (earlier version); H.R. 11942, 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess. § 2 (1978). The word "production" was added because many products subject to price
fixing, such as beef or wheat, are not manufactured. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 14-15.
The terms "purchaser" and "seller" were defined as "anyone who acquires or sells a property
interest in return for valuable consideration." Id. at 15. These terms were chosen to avoid
disturbing the case law concerning which persons have standing under § 4. Id.; see, eg.,
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975) (zone of interests test); Mulvey v.
Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970) (target area approach), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 923 (1971); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) (same); Loeb
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); note 172 infra.
172. Basically, there are three different standing tests applied to § 4 of the Clayton Act, Tile
first is the direct injury test which incorporates privity into the antitrust laws. This test examines
the relationship between the defendant violator and the plaintiff. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125-28 nn.6-9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). The second
test is the target area approach which focuses on the plaintiff's relationship to the area of the
economy affected by the violation. Id. The last, and most recently enumerated approach, Is tile
zone of interests test. This analyzes the claimant's injury in terms of the zone of interests
protected by the statute under which the claim is asserted. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 36,
at 809-45; Hoffman, Antitrust Standing: Congress Responds to Illinois Brick, 1978 Wash. L.Q.
529, 538-43.
173. 431 U.S. at 728 n.7 (citing Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1166 (1976);
Handler & Blechman, supra note 59, at 644-45).
174. It should be noted that Congress did intend to deny some individuals standing to sue.
The House Committee provided several examples of indirect purchasers it considered to be
outside "the chain": (1) consumers, such as the consumers of shoes in Hanover Shoe, who buy a
product manufactured by a price-fixed capital good which has an insubstantial affect on the price
of the finished product; (2) consumers who purchase goods and services from a business that buys
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The final issue presented by the first section concerns the applicable
measure of damages. As previously stated, Hanover Shoe held that the
overcharge, except in certain limited situations,"s was the exclusive measure
of damages. Unlike an earlier House proposal, 7 6 the current bill does not
contain an explicit requirement that damages be measured solely in terms of
the original overcharge.1 77 It does appear, however, that such a limitation
was intended by the drafters of the current joint proposal. 178 Despite this
intention, its deletion from the final version of the bill may cause uncertainty
in the future.' 79
B. Section 4(I)(2)-Hanover Shoe Limited
Section 41(2) provides:
In any action under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act, the defendant shall be entitled
to prove as partial or complete defense to a damage claim, in order to avoid
duplicative liability to it, that the plaintiff has passed on to others, who are themselves
entitled to recover under 4, 4A or 4C of this Act some or all of what otherwise would
constitute plaintiffs damage.' 80
In order to prevent duplicative damage awards, this provision partially
repeals the holding of Hanover Shoe. Its repeal is not absolute because a
defendant cannot introduce defensive pass-on evidence unless there exists a
genuine potential for duplicative liability. According to the section's language,
the pass-on defense may be raised only "in order to avoid duplicative liability"
and only when the defendant can establish "that the plaintiff has passed [the
overcharge] on to others, who are themselves entitled to recover."' 8 ' Thus, if
price-fixed overhead items, such as stationery, building maintenance services, and coal used to
heat the business' buildings; (3) buyers of used homes that are equipped with price-fixed brass
tubing; and (4) taxpayers of a governmental entity that buys price-fixed goods and services, unless
that entity resells the goods and services in a proprietary manner. See 1978 House Report, supra
note 89, at 17-18.
175. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
176. See H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2 (1978).
177. Damages may also be measured by a direct purchaser's lost profits, see notes 162-63 and
accompanying text, and/or the sum of the intermediate mark-ups ultimately passed on to an
indirect purchaser. See notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
178. Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (May 10, 1979).
179. See 125 Cong. Rec. H688 (1979) (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1979) (remarks of Rep. McClory).
One may argue that limiting indirect purchaser damages to the amount of the initial overcharge
is contrary to the emphasis given compensation under § 4 and S. 300. Inasmuch as intermediate
mark-ups are reasonably foreseeable by an antitrust defendant, one might conclude that liability
for such increases should be imposed. This conclusion, although apparently valid, ignores the
political feasibility of a provision that would significantly increase a defendant's potential liability
by holding him responsible for mark-ups outside his control.
180. S. 300, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1979).
181. Id. This proposed limited repeal of Hanover Shoe has the same pro-plaintiff orientation
as that originally proposed under the first Senate bill. S. 1874 provided: "In any action under
section 4, or 4A, the defendant shall be entitled to prove as partial or complete defense to a
damage claim, that the plaintiff has passed on to others who are themselves entitled to sue under
section 4, 4A or 4C some or all of what would otherwise constitute plaintiff's damage." S. 1874,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 3 (1978). H.R. 11942, on the other hand, authorized the defense when the
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an indirect purchaser is not entitled to recover because, for example, his
action was barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant could not raise a
pass-on defense.18 2
Under an earlier draft of this section, the defendant's defensive use of
pass-on evidence was left to the discretion of the court and was contingent
upon the possibility of duplicative liability.1 8 3 This earlier draft was arguably
more pro-plaintiff than the current proposal because a court could exclude
defensive pass-on evidence if it believed that an indirect purchaser was
unlikely to assert his claim even though he was still entitled to recover. 184
Although the present provision does not permit assertion of defensive pass-on
in every situation, it leaves open the possibility that a court will accept
defensive pass-on evidence without examining whether the indirect purchaser
will actually assert his claim. Such an interpretation of this section may have
an adverse effect on antitrust enforcement because, if it is unlikely that the
indirect purchaser will assert his claim, the defendant may escape liability.
Leaving the matter to the discretion of the court is therefore the better
alternative as it may encourage further inquiry into the actual potential for
duplicative liability. Although one may criticize this restrictive interpretation
of the use of defensive pass-on as being inequitable, it is nonetheless justified
for several reasons. First, it would reinforce as well as effectuate the holding
of Hanover Shoe by preventing the defendant from escaping liability. Second,
it precludes the defendant from availing himself of the legal system for which
he shows no respect, and finally, it serves the deterrence objective of section 4.
C. Attorney's Fees
Two sections of the current proposal deal with attorney's fees and are
designed to discourage strike suits.18 5 Section 41(3) provides:
In any class action under section 4 of this Act and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and in any action under section 4 of this Act by or on behalf of any
government, the amount of the plaintiff's attorney's fee, if any, shall be determined by
the court.18 6
This provision responds to the opponents of indirect purchaser actions who
contend that such suits will only serve the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys. 187
defendant could prove that the direct purchaser passed on all or part of the overcharge to another
purchaser in the chain. H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2 (1978). The assertion of the
defense was an absolute right that was not expressly contingent on the availability or viability of
a subsequent purchaser's claim.
182. One other point concerning § 4(I)(2) is worthy of mention. Consumers ordinarily buy in
the capacity of indirect purchasers and therefore appear at the end of the distribution chain.
Defendants in such a situation will not be allowed to use defensive pass-on evidence because the
indirect purchasers cannot pass on the illegal overcharge to others who are themselves entitled to
recover.
183. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979) (earlier version).
184. Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (Mar. 12, 1979).
185. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 23.
186. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979).
187. S. 1874 Hearings, supra note 79, at 69 (statement of Michael Blechman and Milton
Handler).
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In their view, because individual plaintiffs in a class action receive only de
minimus recoveries while their attorneys receive generous fees, the major
impetus for such suits will be supplied by the attorneys rather than the injured
plaintiffs. 188 In order to deter such frivolous strike suits and settlements
which favor plaintiffs' attorneys, this provision establishes the court as a
fiduciary to protect the interests of both indirect and direct purchaser plain-
tiffs. 18 9 In addition, it supplements rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires courts to approve any settlement of a class ac-
tion.1 90 Under this provision, the court must now apportion the damage
award between the class members and their attorney(s) prior to such ap-
proval. 9 1 The attorney will be compensated for the reasonable value of his
services and such compensation shall "be made with an eye toward modera-
tion."' 92
Section 5 of the current proposal, amending section 4 of the Clayton Act,
also attempts to deter strike suits. It provides:
The Court may, in its discretion, award a reasonable attorney's fee to a prevailing
defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' 93
The provision incorporates a malice requirement in order to encourage
responsible litigation. 194 This section, like its counterpart in the parens
patriae title,' 95 is intended to codify recent case law concerning bad faith
actions.' 96 Although the earlier draft of S. 300 did not contain either attor-
ney's fee provision, inclusion in the current proposal is warranted both as a
concession to defendants and as a means of fostering meritorious private
damage claims.
D. Trial Joinder Procedures
Section 4 of the current proposal amends the Multidistrict Litigation Act' 97
to permit the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate direct
and indirect purchaser actions. 198 This provision gives the Panel the dis-
188. Id.
189. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 23; see Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).
190. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
191. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 23.
192. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., [1977] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61.612, at 72,548 (2d
Cir. 1977) (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974)); see Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 110 (3d Cir.
1976).
193. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1979).
194. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 24.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d)(2) (1976).
196. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 413, 420-24 (1978); Carrion
v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976); United States Steel Corp. v. United States,
519 F.2d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 1975).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
198. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 24.
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cretionary authority to utilize trial joinder procedures in order to minimize the
potential for inconsistent adjudications. Although trial consolidation will be
effective only when separate actions have already been initiated, 199 this
section will help alleviate the problems of added judicial burden as well as
protect defendants from multiple liability in such instances.2
0 0
E. Application Date
The bill's final provision concerns its application date. Section 6 provides:
(a) The amendments made by this Act, except as provided in section 6(b), shall
apply to any action under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act which is pending on
the date of enactment of this Act or which is commenced on or after the date of
passage of this Act.
Provided, however, that in any case pending on the date of enactment of this Act in
which a direct purchaser or seller is a party plaintiff, the court shall take all steps
necessary to avoid duplicative liability for the same injury, including preclusion of
subsequently filed actions not consolidated with previously filed actions seeking
damages for the same injury. Provided, fitrther, that where such actions are consoli-
dated, the court shall apportion damages according to actual injury.
(b) Section 41(2) of the Clayton Act, as added by section 2 of this Act, shall apply to
any action under section 4 or 4A of the Clayton Act which is commenced on or after
the date of enactment of this Act.
20
'
These provisions serve three main purposes. First, they correct any potential
constitutional problems raised by the original Senate proposal. The provisions
of the first Senate proposal would have applied to actions that were pending
or filed on or after June 9, 1977, the date of the Illinois Brick decision. 20 2
This would have nullified the effect of Illinois Brick on indirect purchaser
actions pending or initiated on or after the date of the decision. Inasmuch as it
is conceivable that a final judgment could be rendered after June 9, 1977 and
before the enactment of the bill, opponents argued that the provision was
199. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
200. Another provision which should be noted, but is beyond the scope of this Comment, is §
3 of the current proposal. This section authorizes treble damage suits by foreign governments,
departments, or agencies thereof against antitrust violators. Its limited authorization, however,
modifies the Supreme Court's decision in Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
In Pfizer, several foreign nations brought separate actions, which were later consolidated, against
six pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Each
foreign government claimed that it had been damaged in its business or property and sought
treble damages under § 4. The Court held that a foreign government otherwise entitled to sue In
the courts of the United States was a "person" within the meaning of § 4. Id. at 320. Section 3
restricts Pfizer by requiring that the alleged violation be unlawful in the plaintiff's territory and
by limiting the recovery to actual damages. Its inclusion in S. 300 represents a compromise
designed to enlist the support of various manufacturers and members of the defendants' bar.
Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
(May 11, 1979).
201. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1979).
202. See S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1978). Under this section, a case was considered to
be pending if it was within the jurisdiction of, or reviewable by, any district or appellate court or
by the Supreme Court. 1978 House Report, supra note 89. at 25. It appears that this definition is
equally applicable to the current proposal.
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unconstitutional because it was retroactive. 20 3 The current proposal, with the
exception of section 41(2), however, is applicable only to actions pending on or
after the date of enactment, thereby eliminating this problem.
204
Second, this section additionally provides several means for ameliorating
the multiple liability problem that may arise in connection with these pending
cases. In order to protect the defendant from the inequitable results of
inconsistent adjudications, it gives the court authority to preclude actions
initiated by indirect purchasers subsequent to the initial damage claim as-
serted by direct purchasers. This authority was granted in order to encourage
indirect purchasers to join the initial action. This provision further minimizes
the potential for inconsistent findings as to the pass-on issues presented by
these pending cases by effectively requiring the indirect purchaser to assert his
newly found right to damages in the original action filed by the direct
purchaser.
The third purpose served by this section is that it eliminates the possibility
of duplicative recoveries by statutorily recognizing apportionment of damages
in pending cases. Because, as noted below 205 , the pass-on defense cannot be
asserted in pending cases, defendants could easily incur duplicative liability.
Once separate direct and indirect purchaser claims are successfully combined
in one forum, the court has the authority to apportion the damage award
between the adverse claimants. The direct purchaser will receive that portion
of the overcharge he has absorbed, whereas the indirect purchaser will be
awarded the portion that was ultimately passed on to him.
20 6
It is important to note that the provision concerning a defendant's use of
defensive pass-on evidence applies only to actions commenced on or after the
enactment of the current proposal. 20 7 Although application of this section to
pending cases would not be unconstitutional, Congress decided to protect the
interests of direct purchasers who instituted damage claims subsequent to
Illinois Brick and prior to the enactment of the current proposal. This
provision favors those purchasers who, in reliance on Illinois Brick, expended
large sums of money presuming that the defendant could not defeat their
damage claims by utilizing defensive pass-on evidence. It is conceivable,
however, that indirect purchasers can defeat the congressional intention of
protecting direct purchasers by asserting their own claims to the damage
fund. According to one congressional official, however, the potential of such a
situation is minimized by the statute of limitations as well as the small time
period envisioned until the enactment of the proposal. 20 8
203. See Hoffman, Antitrust Standing: Congress Responds To Illinois Brick, 1978 Wash.
Univ. L.Q. 529, 559; cf. 1978 Senate Report, supra note 90, at 47-48 (Sen. Allen's analysis of the
potential constitutional infirmities of S. 1874 wherein he discusses the need to protect direct
purchaser expectations in receiving the entire damage award.
204. Shenefield Statement, supra note 12, at 13.
205. See note 207 infra and accompanying text.
206. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1084 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Rodos & McMahon, supra note 30, at 118-20.
207. See notes 180-84 supra and accompanying text.
208. Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the




The effectiveness of S. 300 could be enhanced by incorporating several
modifications. One important improvement would be the inclusion of a
provision authorizing classwide proof of injury and damages, similar to that
contained in the original draft of the current proposal. 20 9 Such a provision
would furnish an effective means of ensuring the certification of indirect
purchaser class actions as well as reducing the complexity associated with
pass-on evidence.
Authorization of indirect purchaser damage claims without this provision
may result in the denial of certification when such claims are asserted as class
actions. 210 If each claimant must prove damages on an individual basis,
indirect purchaser class actions would often fail the commonality requirement
of rule 23(a)(2) as well as the manageability requirement of rule 23(b)(3). 211
In addition, because pass-on questions may predominate over the common
questions of liability and the assessment of damages, these actions may not
satisfy the predomination requirement of rule 23(b)(3). 212 The incorporation
of a provision calling for classwide proof of injury and damages would
therefore assure the viability of indirect purchaser class actions.
The authorization of classwide proof of injury and damages would also
significantly reduce the difficulty of proving that an overcharge was passed
on. Such proof of damages would be facilitated by allowing the class to
recover average damages on behalf of all class members. As originally
proposed, the Act contained a presumption that the total damages attributa-
ble to a member of such a class would be equal to the ratio of that member's
purchases or sales to the purchases or sales of the class as a whole. 2 13 Indeed,
the use of similar statistical methods in calculating an individual's damages
has been endorsed by several courts.
2 14
209. Section 2 of the original draft of S. 300 provided: "In any action brought under section 4
or 4C of this Act by or on behalf of a class of purchasers or sellers, the fact of injury and the
amount of damages sustained by or passed-on to or by the members of the class may be proven on
a classwide basis, without requiring proof of such matters by each individual member of the
class. The percentage of total damages attributable to a member of such class shall be the same as
the ratio of such member's purchases or sales to the purchases or sales of the class as a whole."
S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979) (earlier version).
210. Rule 23(a) sets forth the prerequisites to class actions: "One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class." Once these prerequisites are met the action must fit within one of the 3 types of class
actions authorized by rule 23(b). Indirect purchaser class actions would most likely satisfy rule
23(b)(3) which permits class action status if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."
211. Shenefield Statement, supra note 12, at 11-13; Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin,
Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 17, 1979); see note 210 supra.
212. See note 210 supra.
213. S. 300, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1979) (earlier version).
214. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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Opponents of these damage provisions assert that they unnecessarily
extend rule 23. They believe that the provisions are without judicial prece-
dent 15 and manifest an overreaction to the potential manageability problems
presented by indirect purchaser class actions.2 1 6 Moreover, opponents con-
tend that the provisions, if adopted, should be presented as amendments to
rule 23 rather than included in an act exclusively designed to authorize
indirect purchaser actions under section 4.217 This opposition was strong
enough to force the deletion of these damage provisions from the original draft
of the current proposal.
Rejection of these provisions, however, is inimical to the Act's objectives.
Recognition of indirect purchaser damage claims and the offensive use of
pass-on evidence necessitates a means to minimize the resultant complica-
tions. Indeed, Congress made this same determination only three years ago
when it incorporated similar provisions into HSR.2 18 In addition, these
provisions are necessary to allow indirect purchasers to bring class actions.
Although some indirect purchasers, such as municipalities, will suffer
sufficient damages to justify the institution of individual suits, class actions
will often be the only economically practical mechanism open to injured
consumers. The availability of parens patriae actions, designed to provide an
effective remedy for these consumers, is contingent upon a state's financial
commitment to antitrust enforcement. Thus, given the importance of class
actions, these damage provisions should be re-incorporated into the current
proposal.
In addition to the inclusion of the class action provisions, other procedural
improvements can enhance the effectiveness of the proposed bill. For exam-
ple, defendants who choose not to interplead or join injured indirect pur-
chasers do not merit protection when they later assert that such claims should
be precluded because of the potential for inconsistent adjudications. Courts
should condition the defensive use of pass-on evidence on the defendant's
interpleading or joining those indirect purchasers known to have been in-
jured. 21 9 Although this may increase a defendant's total liability, the imposition
of this condition precedent to the assertion of the pass-on defense is justified
by principles of equity.
Attempts also should be made to maintain the direct purchasers' incentive
to sue. One of these measures, not addressed by the bill, would be to allow
direct purchasers to recover for their lost profits in addition to the proportion
of the overcharge they absorbed. Because it is probable that a portion of the
overcharge will be passed on, providing for lost profits would furnish an
inducement for direct purchaser actions..2 20
215. 1978 House Report, supra note 89, at 58-59 (statement of Rep. Flowers). For a case
holding that rule 23 requires each class member to prove his individual damages, see Ralston v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,772, at 95,358 (W.D. N1o. 1973).
216. Telephone Interview with Joel Perwin, Staff Counsel to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (May 8, 1979).
217. Id.
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976).
219. McGuire, supra note 4, at 202; The Future qfIndirect Purchasers, supra note 103. at
335-36 n.111 (1979).
220. See notes 162-63 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The authorization of indirect purchaser damage claims under section 4
provided by S. 300 sufficiently cures the negative effects of Illinois Brick. It
balances all the relevant policy considerations rather than neglecting one in
order to advance another. This is accomplished by providing for compensa-
tion and deterrence while taking measures which lessen complexity and the
potential for multiple liability. Although it should incorporate procedures,
such as those recommended above, which would create a more effective
private antitrust damage remedy, the proposal, even in its present form,
merits immediate enactment and implementation.
Andrew Tureff
